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CASENOTES
ANTITRUST LAWS - AGREEMENT AMONG COMPETING
PHYSICIANS SETTING MAXIMUM FEES THAT MAY BE
CLAIMED FOR HEALTH SERVICES PROVIDED TO POLICY-
HOLDERS OF SPECIFIED INSURANCE PLANS IS A PER SE
VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT. Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
A medical society and the two foundations which it had formed
were the defendants in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society.'
The foundations were composed of licensed physicians. One of the
foundation's primary functions was to construct tables of maximum
fees that member doctors would accept as full payment for services
provided to patients who belonged to foundation-approved insurance
plans.' The State of Arizona filed a complaint against the defendants
in federal district court alleging that the foundation's activities consti-
tuted illegal price fixing conspiracies in violation of section I of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.3 Pursuant to an interlocutory appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Dis-
trict Court's refusal to enter a partial summary judgment and found
that the issues could not be resolved without evaluating the agreement
at a full trial.4 However, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's denial of summary judgment, holding that a maximum
fee arrangement between competing physicians was aper se violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Initially state statutes were found to be insufficient to prevent re-
straints of trade affecting interstate commerce.6 Therefore, in 1890,
Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act as the first of the Ameri-
can antitrust laws.7 The Act seeks to protect the public from restraints
on competition,8 and is based on the premise that the lowest prices,
highest quality, and best allocation of economic resources can only be
achieved when the interaction of competitive forces is unrestrained.9
Section I of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part that:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
1. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
2. Id at 339. Other purposes enumerated in the foundation agreement were to re-
view the treatment administered to patients to determine if it was necessary and
appropriate, and to draw checks on the accounts of insurance companies to pay
doctors for services rendered to covered patients. Id at 339-40.
3. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
4. Maricopa, 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
5. 457 U.S. at 357.
6. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940).
7. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)); see Borsody, The Antitrust Laws and the Health Industry, 12
AKRON L. REV. 417, 449 (1979).
8. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 43 (1930).
9. Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
542 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 12
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."' In the early decisions,
some courts literally interpreted this section to mandate that every
agreement restraining trade, whether reasonable or unreasonable, was
illegal." However, the Supreme Court recognized that every trade
agreement restrains trade to some extent' 2 and that the scope of the
Sherman Act is very broad. 3 Hence, the Court promptly realized the
need to restrict the scope of section I by adopting a standard to aid in
determining whether an agreement was, in fact, a restraint of trade.'
4
Because the Sherman Act did not expressly provide for such a stan-
dard, the Court adopted the common law standard of reasonableness,
rendering literal interpretations of the section obsolete.
The application of the rule of reason to section I cases requires a
determination of whether a particular restraint reasonably promotes
competition or unreasonably suppresses it. 6 In making that determi-
nation, the circumstances surrounding each case must be considered.' 7
However, some types of restraints are unreasonable per se and there-
fore do not necessitate an elaborate inquiry into their effects. 8 An
agreement is condemned as a per se violation of section I when it is
manifestly anti-competitive and void of any redeeming qualities.' 9
10. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
11. See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 331 (1904); United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327-28 (1897); Wheeler-
Stenzel Co. v. National Window Glass Jobbers' Ass'n, 152 F. 864, 868 (3d Cir.
1907).
12. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
13. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
14. Id
15. Id
16. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Hect v.
Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
17. Butterick Pub. Co. v. FTC, 85 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1936). Factors which aid in
the decisional process regarding the reasonableness of a restriction are the condi-
tions before and after a restraint is imposed, the facts that are peculiar to the
business in question, the nature of the restraint and its effect on competition, and
any other relevant factors. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918).
18. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 574 (2d Cir. 1961).
Theper se rule is not inconsistent with the rule of reason. United States v. E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 387 (1956). If a particular restraint does
not fall within aper se category, then the legality of the restraint must be deter-
mined under the rule of reason. Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,
570 F.2d 72, 82 (3d Cir. 1977).
19. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 262 (1963). The application of
the per se rule avoids complicated and prolonged investigations into the entire
history of the industry involved. Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958). For examples of types of agreements that have been condemned
as unreasonable per se, see International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947) (tying arrangements); Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468
(1941) (boycotts); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210,
(1940) (price fixing agreements).
In addition to federal law regulating restraints of trade, most states have
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medchal Society
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 20 the United
States Supreme Court held that the agreement in question violated sec-
tion I of the Sherman Act, per se, notwithstanding that the agreement
involved maximum as opposed to minimum price fixing, professionals
rather than nonprofessionals, a novel concept, and possible procompe-
titive justifications. First, the Court declared that maximum price re-
straints are as deleterious as minimum price restraints because the
maximum restraints provide the same economic rewards to all physi-
cians regardless of their skills, resulting in a diminished use of innova-
tive procedures and a lack of new physicians entering the market.2'
Second, the Court acknowledged prior decisions which recognized that
the public aspects of certain professions may warrant different treat-
ment under the Sherman Act,2 2 but refused to afford such treatment to
the Maricopa plan after deciding that the plan was not premised on the
public aspects of the health care profession.23  Third, the majority
found that the novelty of the agreement was an insufficient reason for
refusing to apply theper se rule, and reasoned that the purpose of the
rule would be greatly frustrated if its application could be avoided by
every industry that has not been subjected to considerable antitrust liti-
gation.24 Next, the Court rejected, as a "misunderstanding of theper se
concept," respondent's argument that the agreement should not be con-
demned because of its procompetitive justifications.25 Finally, the ma-
jority found the Maricopa plan to be fundamentally different from the
price restraint in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc.,26 which was upheld as reasonable because it only involved
adopted some type of antitrust legislation. See Reynolds, A Practitioner's Guide to
the Maryland Antitrust Act, 36 MD. L. REv. 323, 325 (1977).
20. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
21. Id at 348. Without elaborating, the Court also rejected the argument that the
agreement should escapeper se condemnation because it involved horizontal as
opposed to vertical price fixing and concluded that, "horizontal restraints are gen-
erally less defensible than vertical restraints." Id at 348 n.18.
22. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'r v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-89, n.17 (1975).
23. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 349. The agreement was not premised on public service
because the respondents failed to assert that the quality of their treatment was
enhanced by the price restraint. Id
24. Id at 351. The Court also found this argument inconsistent with precedent.
Quoting from United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the
Court stated, "Whatever may be its peculiar problems and characteristics, the
Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uni-
form rule applicable to all industries alike." Id at 222, quoted in Maricopa, 457
U.S. at 349.
25. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 351. According to the majority, this argument indicates a
misunderstanding of the per se concept because "[t]he anticompetitive potential
inherent in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if
procompetitive justifications are offered for some." Id (footnote omitted).
26. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The Court found the Maricopa agreement different from the
Columbia agreement in two respects: (1) the blanket license in Columbia was
completely different from any one product that the composer was able to sell him-
self, whereas in Maricopa the combination in the form of the foundations did not
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price fixing in the literal sense.27 As a result of the above analysis, the
Court granted summary judgment, and concluded that the Maricopa
plan lacked any justifications which would distinguish it from the type
of price-fixing arrangements considered per se violations of the Sher-
man Act.28
A strong dissent stressed the majority's failure to emphasize im-
portant aspects of the record, its improper application of theper se rule,
and its inadequate attempt to distinguish precedent. The dissent as-
serted that the Court was required to infer from the record that the
Maricopa agreement had pro-competitive justifications. 29 Therefore,
before the majority granted summary judgment, it should have ad-
dressed the question of whether an agreement that benefits the con-
sumer should be condemned under the Sherman Act.3° Other aspects
of the record which the dissent believed deserved greater consideration
were that the foundation agreement did not actually prevent competi-
tion 31 and that the insurer represents the interests of the consumer.32 In
addition, the dissent contended that the majority erroneously applied
theper se rule by failing to "acknowledge thatper se characterization is
inappropriate if the challenged agreement or plan achieves for the pub-
lic pro-competitive benefits that otherwise are not attainable. 33
According to the dissent, the majority was content simply to label the
plan as "price-fixing" and distinguish it as "fundamentally different"
from the agreement in Columbia Broadcasting, which also involved
price-fixing in the literal sense. 34 Finally, the dissent asserted that be-
cause the per se rule is strictly a creature of the judiciary, the duty to
enable the physicians to sell a different product; and (2) the competition among
the composers in Columbia was not as severe as that among the physicians in
Maricopa. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356-57.
27. The Columbia Court held that an arrangement by which copyright clearinghouses
sold performance rights to their entire libraries on a blanket rather than an indi-
vidual basis did not warrant condemnation on a per se basis and was merely
price-fixing in the literal sense. Columbia, 441 U.S. at 8-9.
28. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356-57. The Court also interjected that any argument con-
cerning an alteration of theper se rule would be better directed to the legislature.
Id at 354-55.
29. See id at 360 (Powell, Rehnquist, J.J. and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
30. Id
31. Id According to the dissent, member physicians were free to associate with other
insurance plans at any fee level, they could engage in business with nonmember
physicians, and they were not locked into the plan for more than one year. Id
32. Id at 360-61. The dissent found that as a practical matter the insurer represents
the consumer's interest. Therefore, insofar as no evidence had been presented in-
dicating that insurance companies had opposed the Maricopa plan, it logically
followed that the plan benefited the consumer. Id
33. Id at 364.
34. Id The dissent argued that the two plans were similar in major respects. First,
"[ejach [plan] involved competitors and resulted in cooperative pricing." Second,
"[e]ach arrangement also was prompted by the need for better service to the con-
sumers." Third, "[ejach arrangement makes possible a new product by reaping
otherwise unattainable efficiencies." Id at 364-65 (footnotes omitted).
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define its application has always been left to the courts and not to thelegislature.3'
The dissent contains the more flexible, well-reasoned analysis.
The majority's mechanical application of theper se rule condemning
the agreement based on a limited record without considering its
pro-competitive justifications accords with neither precedent nor logic.
In its application of theper se rule, the majority over-emphasized the
otherwise legitimate concern of avoiding the cost and judicial burdens
that a detailed inquiry entails. The avoidance of such burdens is not, in
itself, sufficient to justify the application of theper se rule resulting in
an order for summary judgment.36 When a court addresses a motion
for summary judgment, it must interpret inferences drawn from the
record in a light most favorable to the respondents.37 As the majority
acknowledged, the necessary inferences that should have been drawn
from the record were: (1) that the agreement "impose[d] a meaningful
limit on physicians' charges"; (2) that it "enable[d] the insurance carri-
ers to limit and calculate more efficiently the risks they underwrite";
and (3) that it resulted in "an effective cost containment mechanism
that has saved patients and insurers millions of dollars."'38 The Court's
granting of summary judgment, after placing little importance on these
inferences, effectively condemned an agreement that benefited the con-
sumer, a result which directly contravenes the purpose of the Sherman
Act.
39
When faced with respondent's contention that theper se rule was
inapplicable because of the plan's benefits to the consumer, the Court
avoided the issue by labeling the argument "a misunderstanding of the
per se concept."4 The majority seemed satisfied to categorize the plan
as unlawful price-fixing without giving serious consideration to its pro-
competitive justifications. In so doing, the Court has misconstrued the
application of theper se concept. As the Supreme Court has previously
recognized, an agreement cannot be condemned asper se unreasonable
merely because it involves price-fixing in the literal sense. 4 Before
such condemnation can occur, the Court must determine whether the
agreement meets the accepted standard for applying theper se rule.4 2
This standard, clearly established by prior decisions, states that a re-
straint cannot be condemned as illegalper se unless it has a pernicious
35. Id. at 366.
36. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
37. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
38. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 342.
39. The purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect the consumer from restraints that
destroy competition. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S.
30, 43 (1930).
40. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 351.
41. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9
(1979).
42. Id.
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effect on competition and lacks any redeeming virtue.43
The courts have been especially quick to realize the importance of
satisfying the standard for applying theper se rule when dealing with a
novel and unique agreement due to the scarcity of evidence concerning
such an agreement's affect on competition and its possible redeeming
virtues.' The agreement in this case, involving the health care indus-
try, is certainly a novel45 and unique46 concept. Therefore, after refus-
ing to conduct further inquiry into the Maricopa plan's pro-competitive
effects, the majority could not have determined that the plan had a
pernicious effect on competition and lacked any redeeming virtue with-
out basing its decision on unfounded conclusions.
The majority also misapplied the principle set forth in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar.47 This principle states that "[t]he public service as-
pect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particu-
lar practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the
Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. ' 48 Although
the majority acknowledged this passage they refused to apply it, rea-
soning that the Maricopa agreement was not premised on public serv-
ice.49  This rationale, however, is unconvincing. The respondents
premised their agreement on the fact that it served as an effective cost
containment mechanism that saves patients and insurers millions of
43. Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), cited with approval
in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977).
44. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50-51, 57-59
(1977); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); Worthen
Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 126 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
45. The Ninth Circuit recognized the novelty of the Maricopa agreement by stating,
"In truth, we know very little about the impact of this and many other arrange-
ments within the health care industry. This alone should make us reluctant to
invoke aper se rule with respect to the challenged arrangement." Maricopa, 643
F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
46. One commentator points out several unique aspects of the health care industry:
(1) it is not easily evaluated by consumers, thus consumer choice is not as impor-
tant as it is in other areas; (2) a large portion of services in the industry are com-
pensated by third party insurers; and (3) demand for health care is frequently
controlled by the provider. Rosoff, Antitrust Laws and the Health Care Industry.-
New Warriors Into an Old Battle, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 446, 447 (1979). The same
commentator suggests that "[tihere are many elements unique to the health care
field which may make traditional antitrust approaches inappropriate." Id at 479.
47. 421 U.S. 773, 788-89 n.17 (1975).
48. Id One commentator has suggested this passage indicates that "most activities of
professional groups should be analyzed according to the 'rule of reason,' even
though the conduct complained of might be aper se violation in another context."
Tyler, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.- The Professions are Subject to the Sherman
Act, 41 Mo. L. REV. 1, 11 (1976). The Court also stated in Goldfarb that, "[i]t
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with
other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust
concepts which originated in other areas." Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975).
49. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 349.
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dollars.50 The prevention of exorbitant medical costs, resulting in more
affordable care to the community, certainly constitutes a public service.
Therefore, in rendering its decision, the majority should have consid-
ered the Maricopa plan's impact on the public service aspect of the
health care profession.
Finally, the majority's assertion that an alteration of theper se rule
is better directed to the legislature appears misplaced. The Court cre-
ated theper se rule and determined the types of agreements to which it
should apply.5 The legislature did not participate in defining the rule's
application in the past and the majority gives no valid reason why they
should begin to do so now.
As precedent, future courts should give the Maricopa decision a
very narrow interpretation. The legislature enacted the Sherman Anti-
trust Act as a shield to protect an unwary public against restraints that
destroy competition and attack the stability of the economic system.
The Maricopa Court distorts this purpose and threatens to erase nearly
a century of judicial interpretation by returning to earlier constructions
of the Sherman Act which condemned every restraint of trade regard-
less of whether the restraint was reasonable. If this trend is not re-
versed, then innovative agreements among professionals, which serve
to benefit the public, may be struck down asper se unlawful and their
beneficial effects will be lost forever.
Robert E Rupp
50. Id at 342.
51. Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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